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Foreword
Patrick Keatinge

MAKING SENSE OF IRISH FOREIGN POLICY
A STARTING POINT

In 1963, the choice of Irish foreign policy as a research field seemed obvious to me as a young academic. My choice was underpinned by a benign conjunction of motive, method and opportunity: curiosity laced with a dash of patriotic introspection; a master's degree in International Relations; and a job, as junior, in a three-man politics department. The implementation of this choice proved to be less straightforward. My junior post, while requiring research, also involved an uncomfortably extensive teaching load. I carried sole responsibility for 'modern foreign governments' (fewer of them then, but coming on stream at an alarming rate), as well as 'international institutions', which at least was a more familiar field.

Regarding the research topic of Irish foreign policy, which I had inevitably left rather late in the day, two broad questions arose. The first concerned the scope of the subject and indeed the definition of the term 'foreign policy'. The second was closer to home: 'What knowledge of the case of Ireland in international affairs already existed in the public domain, and what gaps remained?'

WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT?

The study of small states' foreign relations was not much in vogue when the discipline of International Relations was established. International Relations mainly concerned the larger states, the 'powers', of the international system. Small states were often viewed as the unhappy objects of the considerable unpleasantness attached to power politics, but of little interest in themselves. Indeed, when foreign policy was discussed by colleagues with a determinist view of the international system it was easy to wonder whether small states could be considered to possess such a thing as a foreign policy. The answer was to resort to a general proposition, that any sovereign state, whatever its size, must by the definition of sovereignty try to protect its interests and values in its relations with the rest of the world.

The study of foreign policy is concerned with this mission, and the process through which its specific goals are decided and implemented. What all this meant in practice
for a novice student of Irish foreign policy can best be grasped by referring to what was soon to be a rapidly expanding policy agenda.

In the mid-1960s the scope of that agenda was still rather narrow. The main focus was on New York; policy was largely seen through the prism of United Nations membership, then still something of a novelty, and the minister, Frank Aiken, devoted much time to the General Assembly.

Several basic positions were being developed by Aiken on issues where the United Nations had a role, although that role in turn was circumscribed by the overriding rivalry of the superpowers. Nevertheless, there was an Irish line on issues ranging from nuclear non-proliferation to the question of how to handle communist China's possible membership of the General Assembly. Generally Ireland's broad strategy was to be an independent, but helpful, actor in the United Nations General Assembly. What would prove to be a central item in the repertoire, international peacekeeping, was established, even though some hard knocks had been received in the Congo from 1960 to 1964. The United Nations was also the focus for the phenomenon of decolonisation. This United Nations role followed traditional Irish sympathies for newly independent states, while at home, with regard to an exemplary case of frustrated self-determination, it was matched by increasing public pressure for the anti-apartheid cause in South Africa.

Yet not a great deal seemed to happen outside this setting. Bilateral relations with Britain, Ireland's nearest neighbour, by far the hard core of Dublin's international interests, were calm. Even the thorn of partition was, in the early to mid-1960s, being approached through a well-mannered search for a pragmatic modus vivendi with the O'Neill government in Belfast. Nor was Ireland involved in NATO's constant agonising over nuclear doctrine, but above all the potential game-changer – membership of the European Economic Community – was on hold.

The mid-1960s proved to be the calm before a storm which in 1968 took the surprising form of a contagious and widespread challenge to political authority. Popular protests shook governments in the United States, France, Czechoslovakia, and in the shape of civil rights marches in Northern Ireland.

At the outset of 'the Troubles' neither sovereign government in Dublin or London could readily accept the proposition that Northern Ireland was 'foreign'. As violence became endemic in 1969 they found a common interest in containing, and eventually trying to resolve, the conflict in the North.

For Dublin there was now a serious threat to the basic values in civil society, the Constitution, the cohesion of political parties, even the very fabric of society. Containing and resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland amounted to much more than just foreign policy as conventionally conceived. The diplomatic dimension to the Troubles became an essential part of the story and its eventual resolution a generation later. It involved engaging with not just the antagonists in the North itself, but also the government in London and third parties, especially the United States government and Congress, the European institutions in Brussels and other national capitals in Europe. The internationalisation of the northern conflict over the next three decades absorbed a huge proportion of the Irish State's political
capital. The Department of Foreign Affairs provided most of the foot soldiers in this
everend and several of the captains, in its curiously named Anglo-Irish division.

A second growth area from the early 1970s in Irish foreign policy resulted from
EEC membership. The events in Paris in May 1968 had proved to be the beginning
of the end for President de Gaulle, and a change in French foreign policy led to the
reopen of Ireland’s negotiations to enter the EEC. The Department of Foreign
Affairs was in the lead role. As was the case with the North, what followed went far
beyond the confines of traditional diplomacy or of any single government agency.
Most other departments of state and a wide range of economic and social interests
were drawn in to the unique and increasingly complex policy-making system which
interacted with and within the entity we came to know as ‘Brussels’.

The very complexity of the never-ending negotiations with ‘Brussels’ required a
coordinating mechanism between each of the Member States and the EEC. This arose
in the shape of the Foreign Affairs Permanent Representation network. Moreover,
EEC membership also brought with it a novel, if low-profile, attempt to create a new
form of collective diplomacy, namely European Political Co-operation. This in turn
generated pressures on Ireland to expand what had hitherto been a very restricted
network of bilateral relationships. Thus ‘Europe’ – now in the form of the European
Union – replaced the United Nations as the backbone of Irish foreign policy.

A third concentration of activity which emerged in the early-1970s concerned
Ireland’s relations with the now expanded Developing World. This was already a
central feature of the State’s commitment to the United Nations. Now it took the
form of a secular extension of the considerable missionary activities of the churches
in Ireland especially, but not exclusively, in Africa. Although Irish governments
stopped short of the more radical political approaches to the decolonisation of the
former Western-European empires, and involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement
was carefully avoided by Dublin, there was much sympathy with the overall phenom-
emon of decolonisation and its humanitarian aspects. The benchmarking of aid
targets in the United Nations and involvement in EEC aid policies were additional
spurs to what became in effect the main base, along with the promotion of human
rights, of what would later be called an ‘ethical foreign policy’. This orientation also
generated its own constituency of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and was
a strong influence on the broader public; even ‘development education’ became
firmly embedded in the school curriculum.

In summary, the early-1970s marked a new stage in the scope and intensity of
Irish foreign policy, and this was reflected in the increasing complexity of the foreign
policy-making process. This period also started to generate more information about
what the subject of Irish foreign policy was about, but from a very low base.

Sources for the study of Irish foreign policy
In the mid-1960s, so far as hard information about Irish foreign policy was concerned,
it was all too often a question of skating on very thin ice. The historical base was
rudimentary; there was no national archive of primary source material to consult,
and there was little published material. Professor Nicholas Mansergh, when writing on Ireland’s foreign relations in the context of the history of the British Commonwealth, was the exception that proved the rule. Also, at University College Dublin, Professor T. Desmond Williams had, since the 1950s, provided controversial glimpses into the realpolitik of wartime Irish diplomacy.

Observation of the present or very recent past was hardly more rewarding. The academic analysis of Irish politics was in its infancy; at Trinity College Dublin Professor Basil Chubb’s pioneering text, *The Government and Politics of Ireland* was not published until 1970. The media generally lacked the resources to cover international relations in depth; television was still a novelty, and the print media had not got around to appointing foreign correspondents. Above all, a culture of administrative secrecy prevailed in the civil service, and in the then Department of External Affairs in particular. The secrecy was broken only very occasionally. Former diplomat Conor Cruise O’Brien devoted a handful of pages to his former colleagues in Iveagh House and the working of the Department of External Affairs in his 1962 account of the Congo crisis *To Katanga and Back*. There were few official documents in the public domain, and the overall impression was of a strong, silent Foreign Minister looming, if often in *absentia* in New York at the United Nations, over a largely apathetic parliament.

The situation improved gradually through the 1970s. In 1979 an annual journal, *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, was established by the Royal Irish Academy’s National Committee for International Affairs. It became a major source of academic writing on national foreign policy and international issues in general. Since the creation of the National Archives of Ireland in 1988 and the long-awaited release of the archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1991 a substantial body of published research into the history of Irish foreign policy, based on Irish primary sources, has been produced. It has been supplemented by an official documents series, *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy*, published by the Royal Irish Academy, which to date has reached seven volumes covering the period from 1919 to 1945. For those who cannot wait for the document series or the thirty-year rule for state paper releases to catch up with their particular interest, *Irish Studies in International Affairs* has, since 1984, included an annual chronicle of Ireland’s foreign relations.

All of this scholarly activity now takes place in a more open general context. Former politicians, and even some diplomats, write memoirs. At least some parts of the media reach further and reflect more on the relevant issues. Even the culture of secrecy, while by no means vanished, is under attack.

Then there is the Internet. Gone are the days when a researcher, seeking the government’s position on this or that, had to trek to Iveagh House, and take up the time of an overworked official – though also perhaps receiving, not just the relevant piece of paper, but friendly guidance on its interpretation, and even a cup of tea and biscuits. Now the Internet provides much fuller and quicker access to all sorts of data, published work and (sometimes unpublishable) opinion.

The dense online fog of ill-assorted information and opinion serves to remind us of the need to develop a keen sense of selection and judgment. As ever, the ultimate responsibility for accurate analysis remains with the researcher.
ACADEMIC INVESTIGATIONS INTO IRISH FOREIGN POLICY

The expanding agenda of the early-1970s, particularly membership of the EEC, demonstrated that Ireland did indeed have a foreign policy, or it might be more accurate to say 'foreign policies'. It is convenient to use the term in the singular, but it may also be misleading if it stops at the notion that we are dealing with a self-contained policy sector. This does tend to happen in many, if not most, political science texts where the foreign policy chapter is eventually tacked on when all the 'real' (i.e. representative) aspects of politics have been exhaustively chewed over.

Might it not be more rewarding to think of a 'foreign policy dimension' running across the broad spectrum of a state's public policies? That implies that we conceive of our subject in terms which can encompass everything – people, ideas, goods and, sadly, bombs – that passes across the formal boundaries of the state. Nor is it simply a matter of what consenting politicians and diplomats get up to behind closed doors, though that remains a central and intriguing part of the investigation. Many other agencies, public and private, are involved in often complex economic and social contexts. Thus the study of foreign policy cannot be the preserve of any one academic discipline – whether they are aware of it or not, colleagues from history, economics, sociology, business and law are potentially open to co-option.

Yet, if this coat of many colours is to be in fact a coat and if research is to be to some degree inter-disciplinary as well as multi-disciplinary, some attempt has to be made to pull it all together. In the 1970s, those of us with a background in International Relations looked to the sub-field of foreign policy analysis, with its emphasis on how policy was made, to provide a synthesis of sorts. The basic idea was simple enough: the policy-making system worked within two environments, the external and domestic. The former was in effect the global system minus Ireland, the latter the familiar ground of national politics. But very quickly things become more complicated, what with non-state actors (for example, multi-national corporations and terrorist groups) and groups of states (international regions and contact groups). Suffice to say, as in any scholarly field, there are many different axes to be ground before a working research design is reached.

Broadly speaking, the growth of the third-level education system in Ireland took place in parallel with that of the country’s foreign relations. Each of the main policy pillars described above generated its own networks of academic researchers, although their membership often overlapped, for the total number was not large. Individual researchers found like-minded colleagues in other institutions, for the willingness of universities and their departments to accommodate this new-fangled focus on the 'international' varied, to put it kindly. The creation of new teaching posts was often seen in zero-sum terms, and the newer institutions sometimes found it easier to innovate. A Dublin-based researcher in a very venerable institution could be rather envious of the capacity for research and teaching about European integration, on an interdisciplinary basis, in Limerick, well before the mandarins of higher education were prepared to acknowledge there was a proper university there.

By the end of the 1970s there was enough activity in the field of Irish foreign policy to justify a more formal structure of networks. In fact, membership of the EEC
had already stimulated an unsuccessful search for an Institute of International Affairs. In 1977, the Royal Irish Academy, an all-Ireland body with a wide range of committees representing major academic fields, set up the National Committee for the Study of International Affairs. The committee became a central focus for academic research on international relations in the island of Ireland. In addition to annual conferences and periodic seminars, it was responsible for the annual journal and the initiation of the document series already referred to above. In 1991, it was complemented by the creation of the Institute for European Affairs, now the Institute for International and European Affairs (IIEA), a more broadly-based body which undertakes policy research and an extensive programme of meetings.

Relevant research networks also evolved beyond the island, again often with an EEC stimulus. The Irish Association of Contemporary European Studies (IACES), for example, was a member of the Trans European Policy Studies (TEPSA). In this way Irish researchers became active in collective projects and publications, which often involved contacts with foreign policy participants from other countries, thus providing a useful reality check on ivory tower analysis.

All in all, the infrastructure of research into Irish foreign policy was established on a sound base by the early-1990s. The next stage was the expansion of teaching in the field. It could now proceed, and with International Relations now represented in both undergraduate and postgraduate degree courses in every Irish university, the prospect is encouraging.

THE SEVERAL FACES OF NEUTRALITY

Sooner rather than later the observer of Irish foreign policy comes face to face with ‘neutrality’. Or rather, face to faces, for few aspects of Ireland’s foreign relations appear in such contrasting guises. At the risk of oversimplification, three faces can be found. Assuming the point of neutrality is to avoid involvement in war, the first is generally associated with the stance adopted by Ireland during the Second World War in response to a combination of external threats and internal divisions. This austere face of neutrality lingers on in less dire circumstances in the official description of Ireland’s policy as ‘military neutrality’. The State remains outside formal mutual defence pacts, thereby retaining its autonomy on military decisions and avoiding entrapment in the uncertain coils of realpolitik. End of story, apart from the occasional hint that this position is a bargaining chip which just might be negotiable against some major goal, such as the end of partition. But for the most part, neutrality appears as a pragmatic means to achieve the security of the state.

The second face is much more expansive, and here neutrality appears – with something of a flourish – as an end in itself. It is associated with the rhetoric of high moral purpose, applied to a wide range of values. This is the ‘cornerstone’ of a considerable structure, which embodies: a fundamental expression of the external aspect of sovereignty; a comprehensive pacifist orientation, not merely a statement of pacific intent; a prerequisite of an exemplary ethical policy, not just a useful calling card.
in the developing world. These claims are sometimes pitched pretty high, and not all of them stand up to close examination. Packaged as ‘active’ or ‘positive’ this face of neutrality is said to represent the people’s choice, at least if we are to be governed by occasional opinion polls and referendums on European treaties. It is worth noting, though, that so far as the electoral contests of representative government are concerned, this sort of argumentation rarely registers.

There is also a third face of neutrality, which is not nearly so positive; indeed, it is positively sour. At best the policy is seen as deluded or irrelevant, little more than a comfort blanket or sacred cow. At worst it is the stance of a fraudulent and hypocritical free-rider in a world where the costs of security are paid by others. This third face does not often present itself in public discourse, but it does suggest that neutrality is best approached as a contested concept. It also prompts the thought that maybe this rather modest word is an inadequate peg on which to hang so many varied notions. As a metaphor for Ireland’s role in the world it does not get us very far, and it can be a puzzling phenomenon for foreign observers. The trouble is that the search for alternative labels leads mainly to clunky social science jargon which won’t travel far beyond the groves of academe.

THE JOYS OF THE COMPARATIVE METHOD

Not that Ireland has been the only European state to deploy the ‘n’ word. There is a general category of European neutrals to explore, to see what light it casts on the Irish case. Though it was much depleted in the Second World War, in which Ireland, like the other few surviving neutrals, was severely stress-tested, that experience is still, for many people, the main point of reference when thinking about the rights and wrongs of the policy.

Yet opening the windows of the comparative method in more recent times is also instructive. The Cold War, too, made neutrality an unusual position to adopt in Western Europe. It is interesting to reflect on why and how countries such as Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland chose to adopt neutrality. Even in this small sample there were many variations. So far as their historical background is concerned, we are dealing with the residue of a Central European empire, a baroque North European hegemon which had seen better days, and a multilingual democracy of unusual complexity based on a late-medieval military alliance. Only Finland shares something of Ireland’s more recent post-colonial victimhood and a striking geopolitical similarity being also next door to a larger and more powerful neighbour.

Policy cultures also varied. Austria and Switzerland, for example, both tended to be legalistic in their form of neutrality, but Austria’s interpretation of the rules has been more adventurous. Likewise, Finland and Sweden each showed a more pragmatic approach, but while Sweden has been generous with opinions on how the world should be run, Finland was discretion itself. And so on, through different dimensions, including material wealth and vulnerability to the external environment.
At times of increased tension during the Cold War, the so-called ‘new Cold War’ in the early-1980s being a particular case in point, neutrality, in its ostensible role as a security policy, was likely to feature in public debate in Ireland. This generated more information to put Irish behaviour in a comparative context. It was a pleasure to discuss all these things with colleagues from the continental neutrals and the principal tool of research was simple enough – a map of Europe. Neutrality has much to do with geography as seen through the prism of the prevailing military thinking of the day.

And where was Ireland in all of this? There were indeed parallels with the continental neutrals, but on one point a considerable difference – Ireland was in the ‘Brussels Club’, and they were not. By the same token, the continental colleagues were not always prepared to concede that Ireland belonged in the much less formal neutrals’ club. Of course, once the Cold War was over that all changed, but that is another story.

So far as most Irish politicians were concerned, it is doubtful whether observations such as those outlined above were particularly troublesome. By the 1980s neutrality was widely presented as a ‘traditional’ policy and thereby immune to reconsideration, at least within the State. Perhaps for many people it remained simply ‘part of what we are’.

**THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT: CHANGE AND ADAPTATION**

Studying a country’s foreign policy provides a rewarding way into an understanding of the larger forces which affect its overall development and its capacity to adapt to them. Analysing the myriad changes in the ‘external environment’ can be a demanding business, sifting through the merely dramatic to identify what is strategically significant, when the tectonic plates shift and disrupt what had seemed to be established patterns. Sometimes events are obligingly clear. The outbreak of general war in Europe in 1939 was at the very least a self-evident emergency for Ireland. But often change comes in more puzzling forms. The effect of the events of 1968 was hard to read at the time, and an economist might see the end of fixed exchange rates in 1971 as the more important phenomenon as it signalled the end of the post-war economic order. Yet taken together these disruptions shaped Ireland’s policy choices, for good or ill, over the next two decades.

**THE END OF THE COLD WAR 1989–91**

Then the tectonic plates moved again. Between the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 one of the policy-maker’s dominant ‘givens’ – the division of Europe in a bipolar Cold War – ended abruptly and, unless you lived in the Balkans or the Caucasus, peacefully. How did Ireland adapt to the new, less rigidly constrained international order? At the exclusively national level, a general foreign policy White Paper, Challenges and Opportunities Abroad, was published in 1996, reflecting a readiness to take stock of the new situation. Such a procedure was not routine in a political culture which normally
preferred to keep hostages to fortune under wraps inside the foreign ministry. The process of public consultation which preceded the White Paper was also a novelty, as was the creation of a parliamentary committee on foreign affairs. There was, then, a modest degree of catching up in the structure of the policy process, toward a model long seen in other Western democracies.

So far as policy content was concerned, the main ‘local’ issue, the Northern conflict, was not covered in the White Paper. It had developed its own Byzantine procedures, acquired over two painful decades, but the way in which the management of the conflict was internationalised in the 1990s arguably gave it new momentum. In the new environment the stakes for one major actor, the United Kingdom, were altered, and the mediating role of another, the United States, could be much enhanced. The resolution of the conflict was a major achievement for all concerned. By contrast, other small-scale conflicts in Europe and Africa proved less amenable to external intervention, and ambitions for a revived and expanded role for the United Nations were often disappointed. But it was above all in the context of the adaptation of European integration itself that the adaptation of Irish foreign policy evolved.

Through the 1990s the newly titled European Union underwent important changes, largely in response to the emergence of an even bigger Germany in the middle of a much bigger Europe. Institutional developments were negotiated in a series of ever more complex treaties (Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon). EU membership expanded from nine to twenty-seven states, sixteen of which, including Ireland, adopted a new currency, the Euro. The networking of ‘political co-operation’ became a common foreign and security policy, which included a security and defence element. The main drivers of policy adaptation in Dublin came with an array of shiny new European acronyms.

Of course, some things never change. In the mid-1990s, just as neutral Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU, Ireland’s main opposition party engaged in the defence of a neutrality which was supposedly threatened by a predatory NATO which had just lost its best enemy with the demise of the Warsaw Pact. This imaginative crusade was quietly dropped when the party was restored to power. Was neutrality to be reduced to just another ploy in domestic party politics? It proved to be not quite as simple as that. After the trauma of the 9/11 crisis in the United States during 2001 the threat of terrorist violence and the taking of sides gained a new traction throughout most of the international system. Anti-war groups again raised the banner of neutrality in the context of the United States’ use of Shannon airport following the invasion of Iraq in 2003; and neutrality persisted as an issue in the wilful confusion of repeated referendums on ‘Europe’.

**FINANCIAL MELTDOWN – IRISH FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 2008**

Adaptation to the end of the Cold War, for all its complexities, took place in an environment which was largely favourable to Ireland’s interests and values. The next shift in the tectonic plates, with the global financial crisis in 2008, was another
matter altogether. By the time this change took the form of a sovereign debt crisis from the autumn of 2010 it seemed that State, economy and society were being crushed between the tectonic plates themselves.

A prudent academic observer might wait awhile before pronouncing on the effects on Irish policy, foreign or otherwise. But some points are clear. Among the major political and bureaucratic actors in this drama is an exotic mix of Finance Ministers and their officials, bankers both public and private, external institutions (the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) as well as more remote and menacing entities, such as markets and investors. Of course, they have always been a part of the study of international relations – but in happier times a more distant if not quite invisible part. Now it is necessary to get to grips with the story of negotiations of a highly technical nature, conducted in terms of a grotesque mix of euphemism, denial and apocalyptic threat.

It is a sobering realisation that in such an environment the European Union itself is on the defensive; this is a crisis for the euro as well as for Ireland’s financial and economic credibility. Amidst this confusion, positive attitudes toward EU membership – arguably the most significant Irish foreign policy strategy of the last fifty years or so – can no longer be taken for granted. Adaptation to this situation in the short term has already involved negotiating from a position of great weakness, in the context of a formal suspension of full economic sovereignty. Beyond that, there will be a need at the very least to restore a severely damaged international reputation, while simultaneously dealing with huge global issues – climate change and energy, a further shift of influence away from Ireland’s Euro–Atlantic comfort zone, and increasing technological complexity.

There are many imponderables in all of this. If we think in the broadest terms of the course of Irish foreign policy as a series of choices, both tactical (What position should we adopt on the crisis in Ruritania?) and strategic (What is our appropriate geopolitical setting and orientation?), it is clear the latter type of choice is once again to the fore. For example, even before the present crisis the proposition that Ireland was ‘closer to Boston than Berlin’ was raised, in a mood of excessive pride regarding Ireland’s place in the world. Now, in a very different context, this debate and others like it may have some bearing on where we go from here. Whatever the answers prove to be (Boston, Berlin – or both), there are interesting times ahead for Irish foreign policy, and for those who try to make sense of it all.

Further reading


Preface

Ben Tonra, Michael Kennedy, John Doyle and Noel Dorr

THE STUDY OF IRISH FOREIGN POLICY

It is remarkable that notwithstanding the extraordinary growth in the study of International Relations and foreign policy in Ireland over the last ten to fifteen years, that there has not been an effort to compile a contemporary textbook on the subject of Ireland's foreign policy. While several excellent research monographs have been published, to date we have lacked a text that has introduced the subject and brought the student through the historical context, the policy-making machinery and the thematic priorities of present-day Irish foreign policy.

As editors, we were unanimous in our wish to invite Professor Patrick Keatinge to contribute a Preface to just such a text as this. It remains a testament to the quality of Patrick's contribution to the study of Irish foreign policy that his path-breaking early works: The formulation of Irish foreign policy (1973) and A place among the nations: Issues of Irish foreign policy (1978) remain eagerly sought after by graduate students and are among the most frequently thumbed volumes on Irish foreign policy within Irish university libraries. Patrick Keatinge was a pioneer of the study of international relations in Ireland. He was also one of the earliest explorers of Irish foreign policy. As has been noted in a volume dedicated to his achievement, 'it was he who guided at least two generations of academics through the shoals, reefs and rip-tides of international relations and their application to the study of Ireland's relationship(s) with the rest of the world' (Tonra and Ward 2002:2).

Patrick's academic journey – as briefly outlined in his Preface – parallels much of the development of modern Irish foreign policy as he moved from studying diplomatic history and bilateral relations with Britain, through wartime and Cold War neutrality, into a new multilateral world centred upon the United Nations and finally into an engagement with Europe, with a focus on Ireland's place within the European security framework. The goal of the following text is to reassess these themes within a contemporary context and also to address new developments such as the rise of civil society in contributing to the shape of Irish foreign policy, the growing place of human rights within that policy and the profile given to development co-operation in Ireland's relationship with the world. Critically too, Ireland's place in the world economy is addressed, reviewing Irish efforts to pursue prosperity in a world of internationalised trade, investment and finance.
A number of key themes recur through this volume, although they may not feature prominently in chapter headings. The first of these is Ireland’s dedication to multilateral institutions and to working within those institutions to agreed ends. Whether it was the League of Nations, or later the Council of Europe, the United Nations or the European Union, the goal has always been to make these institutions work; to ensure that they operate on the basis of universally applied rules and that they deliver on shared goals. At first sight, there is perhaps no surprise here. In traditional terms, a small state such as Ireland would be expected to make the most of what it can from institutions that can shelter the State from the bitterest winds of international anarchy and from the depredations of global forces and more powerful states. In Ireland’s case, however, the commitment to multilateralism and its associated institutions is arguably more than pragmatic self-interest. Irish history in general and the history of the modern Irish State since independence set a context within which, at both official and popular levels, issues of justice, fairness and legitimacy resonate powerfully. As several of the chapters below will attest, the expectation that the Irish State will do ‘the right thing’ internationally on, for example, human rights, development co-operation, international peacekeeping and conflict resolution, remains high. The fact that the State may regularly fail to meet those expectations, out of choice or by force of circumstance, does not weaken those expectations.

The dedication to multilateralism is perhaps best exemplified in Ireland’s commitment to the United Nations. An early point of concern to the editors was that there was no specific ‘United Nations’ chapter in the volume, no focused attention on the history of Ireland’s membership of the body or its contribution, successes and failures. We knew, of course, that since Ireland joined the United Nations in 1955, its membership of that organisation has been of central importance in Irish foreign policy and practice. We felt, however, that such a chapter would quickly have become almost a mini-summary of the book as whole, since it would have to cover much of the history of Irish foreign policy over the past half century, including Ireland’s profile in international peacekeeping, nuclear non-proliferation and arms control as well as its engagement in human rights and international economic development. Indeed, a case can probably be made to see the United Nations as being the primus inter pares among Ireland’s multilateral engagements.

A second theme that emerges from the chapters below is the striking shift in the centre of political gravity underpinning foreign policy-making. The student who contrasts and compares the basic institutional structures deemed important to the construction of foreign policy with those identified by Patrick Keatinge thirty-five years ago, will find that nothing has significantly changed on the face of it. The Minister, responsible to cabinet, directs a department whose function is to propose and to execute policy as determined by government on behalf of a sovereign and independent state. Names may change; ‘External Affairs’ to ‘Foreign Affairs’ to ‘Foreign Affairs and Trade’ and internal structures may evolve, but the basic parameters are the same. Similarly, the declaration of Article 29.4.1 of the Bunreacht Na hÉireann that ‘The executive power of the State in or in connection with its
external relations shall in accordance with Article 28 of this Constitution be exercised by or on the authority of the Government' implies a clear and definitive hierarchy in the exercise of foreign policy. In foreign policy-making today, however, such an analysis – as the chapters below will indicate – would miss both subtle and substantial shifts that have transformed the process of foreign policy-making.

Many new actors stand on the domestic foreign policy stage, demanding both attention and policy input. The NGO (non-governmental organisation) and activist community has exploded in size over the last twenty to twenty-five years, with a wide variety of thematic, geographic and political interests. Political parties and even think tanks have developed and maintain their own international linkages, devoting time and resources to the analysis of international affairs. Universities too have extended their coverage of international affairs with new degree programmes, research centres and the pursuit of external project funding. For its part, the media (print, broadcast and 'new') juggles commercial realities with ever-increasing editorial demands for broader, deeper and stronger coverage of the world and Irish interests therein. All this while parliamentarians continue to struggle to define their place within the policy ferment; to find both their voice and their role.

For its part, the executive is today seen less as the conductor of foreign policy and more often as the audience for a 'chorus' of voices demanding attention, access and influence. There are also new constitutional and legislative restrictions, which have delimited the extent to which the State may share or pool its foreign, security and defence responsibilities with international partners – just as the State volunteers to undertake new obligations under international law and through multilateral institutions. Perversely, as the government is increasingly bound from both below and from above, the demands for government to act decisively and independently; to make a difference in the world, only increase. While foreign policy rarely surfaces as a critical issue in domestic politics, the public scrutiny and analysis of that policy has rarely been higher.

A third theme that several contributors have either made explicit or have implied, is that Ireland is something of a 'middle power' or at least a State that, to use a phrase which has become something of a cliché, succeeds in 'punching above its weight'. If one were to offer a cruel caricature of this idea, it would be an image of Ireland the valiant, Ireland the good, bringing to bear its unique historical witness and expertise on the world. Part of this is understandably rooted in a long-standing, perhaps naive, belief that having stood apart from war, both hot and cold, Irish foreign policy has been imbued with a certain credibility and independence which can be leveraged to good effect in pursuit of particular international public goods such as peace, justice and socio-economic development. At a minimum it might be argued that by standing even some way apart from those states that are comparatively more willing to use military force, Ireland contributes less to a murderous global arms race and can contribute more powerfully toward collaborative efforts toward international peace and security. From the perspective of Ireland's self-interest, consciously seeking to establish the State’s claim to middle power status does increase Ireland’s power within international affairs beyond that which the country’s size would suggest as being
likely. The use of development aid, peacekeeping forces and support for the United Nations, from this perspective, is not so much a claim of moral superiority but rather a conscious diplomatic strategy, in keeping with Ireland’s political culture, which is designed to maximise the State’s influence. We invite students and readers to interrogate this book on this issue.

A fourth thematic point, and one on which, like the United Nations, the editors discussed the possibility of writing a distinct chapter, is the question of Ireland’s ‘neutrality’. This is one of the best known, if little understood aspects of Irish foreign policy and must certainly be addressed in any book such as this. However, as with the United Nations, this was a theme that we decided was best addressed as a cross-cutting theme to the book, with a focus on its significance for security and defence policy. Neutrality has been used to mean different things in different historic periods. The term was used in a wartime context from 1939–45 and subsequently used to mean non-membership of NATO during the Cold War. Since the 1970s, it has also been used by some writers and campaigners in a much broader sense to encapsulate either an ‘independent’ foreign policy, not formed in the context of EU common positions, or alternatively (or even simultaneously) used to mean a policy with a strong normative focus, with a commitment to development, United Nations peacekeeping, human rights and disarmament. In recent years governments have adopted a more self-consciously restrictive use of the term, often referring to ‘military neutrality’, to emphasise that they see the policy as only requiring the government to refrain from membership of formal defence alliances. These varied uses of the term make an analysis of the debate difficult and the reader can trace these debates in the historically focused chapters and in the chapters on national security, the EU and peacekeeping in particular.

All of the above raises a wider issue. How ‘good’ is Ireland – in both senses of that word? First, how effective has Ireland been in the pursuit of its declared foreign policy goals – whether obviously self-interested or seemingly altruistic? In what foreign policy areas has the Irish State devoted real political effort and precious resources – and to what effect? Where, if anywhere, can one identify the gaps between easy rhetoric and tough diplomatic engagement? Second, in the universe of states, does Ireland offer real added value in terms of values, norms and principles? Are these in any way linked to the aforementioned tradition of military neutrality such that they would materially distinguish the Irish State from, say Norway, Canada or Denmark? Where has Ireland paid a real cost in pursuit of its foreign policy principles? These questions do not invite glib answers. They invite thought, reflection and analysis – most especially in a comparative context, both historic and political.

A final and somewhat contrasting theme evident in at least some of the chapters to follow is the marginality of the Irish State. While a new focus on ‘the Irish diaspora’ has given us an increased sense of the wider Irish presence in the world, do we have an accurate sense of perspective regarding Ireland’s international role? Given the constraints over which a small, peripheral island state has no control and given the extent to which the Irish State has chosen to embed itself purposefully within multilateral institutions – including an economic and political Union which aspires to ‘ever closer union’ – how far can we still talk of an independent Irish foreign
policy? In many chapters of the following text, contributors have drawn attention to the financial crisis of 2008 and the arrival in Ireland in 2010 of the EU/IMF ‘Troika’. Whilst this is the most graphic illustration of the extent to which the Irish State is subject to forces outside its control it is only really remarkable for its clarity. How reasonable is it to expect the Irish State successfully to exert its will on the world? What are the strategies available to such a state to amplify its voice and build upon its ambitions? Is the best that can reasonably be hoped for simply the consistent application of principle to foreign policy and its effective execution?

It may be that the critical reflections above are very much reflective of the times in which they were written. The chapters that follow were all written over the summer of 2011 in the teeth of profound insecurity, not just about the Irish State and its capacity to address foundational economic errors of its own making, but also about the willingness and ability of the European Union to grasp the enormity of its own structural weaknesses. To that end, students and readers should also see the following contributions as status reports from a small island at a particular point in time.

The concept for a comprehensive account of modern Irish foreign policy came in April 2010 through a proposal to the Royal Irish Academy's Committee for International Affairs. The Committee decided to investigate the commissioning and publication of a broad volume that would serve the needs of the growing cohort of students of Irish foreign policy and the broader community of students of comparative foreign policy. The text would comprise chapters written by academic analysts and practitioners of Irish foreign policy under the direction of an editorial team drawn from the Academy Committee for International Affairs.

The International Affairs Committee saw the proposal in a positive light and approved the project. An editorial team of Committee members was proposed and agreed. Potential authors of chapters, each an expert in their relevant field, were identified from a wide cross-section of disciplines. By the autumn of 2010 the line-up of editors and authors for the volume was complete.

The RIA's Publications Committee gave the project its support and approval in late September 2010 as did senior figures in the RIA including the then President of the Academy Professor Nicholas Canny, and the RIA's Executive Secretary Mr Patrick Buckley.

The Publications Committee asked that the editors pursue contacts with likely publishers. After discussions with a half a dozen national and international publishers, the editors chose to work with Gill & Macmillan on the publication of the volume. The enthusiasm of Gill & Macmillan for the project and the professionalism with which they approached its execution were both impressive.

By the summer of 2011 draft contributions were taking shape, and to examine progress, the contributors met for a one-day round table conference in Academy House in late June. At this conference ideas and content were discussed, areas of contention, debate and overlap were examined and the first broad shape of the volume became clear. A stringent publication and production timetable were put in place, with final draft chapters to be submitted by October 2011. The editors are most grateful to all contributors for adhering to the ambitious deadlines set.
In addition, the editors would like to express their particular thanks to colleagues who have contributed substantially to this project. First and foremost, our appreciation goes to Dr John Maguire of the Royal Irish Academy (RIA) who, as Secretary to the Academy Committee for International Affairs, helped enormously in getting the project off the ground. Thanks also to Ruth Hegarty, Managing Editor, and Helena King, Assistant Editor at the Academy Publications Office for their advice and support. Mr Niall Matthews, Academic Programmes Assistant at the Academy undertook the extraordinary task of market research for the book – including a comprehensive audit of all third-level institutions and programmes with a profile in international relations, peace studies, international relations history, foreign policy analysis, development studies and international law. Finally we offer our thanks to Marion O’Brien at Gill & Macmillan who in her work with us has exemplified the very best in Irish publishing.

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Chapter 1 – Theories, Concepts and Sources

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The study of Ireland’s foreign policy draws on international literature and debates that have been developed for the study of foreign policy in many different periods and contexts. Some of these debates are universal and the issues for Ireland, such as the role of parliaments and domestic public opinion, or the significance of the personality of political leaders might draw easily on an approach developed for a different country. There are nevertheless specific challenges facing Ireland as a small state member of the European Union located on the western geographical periphery of Europe which would be quite different to the contexts facing international powers such as Russia, China, Tanzania or even Iceland. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the wider theoretical debates on international relations and foreign policy, assert the importance of historical context when studying foreign policy and show the conceptual issues that need to be clarified when writing on international relations. Finally, the chapter will discuss the growing range of Irish and Irish-related primary sources related to almost a century of independent Irish foreign policy which are available to researchers and introduce how they can be successfully utilised to advance our understanding of Irish foreign policy.

THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

The earliest core text for the study of international relations is often said to be that of Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War – the fifth century BC conflict between Athens and Sparta. In an approach that was strikingly ‘scientific’ for the time, Thucydides sought to explain the causes of that war without reference to divine intervention. Significantly, he argued that the relations between the Greek city states of the era were governed by the pursuit of power, with war being the inevitable crucible of conflict resolution.

Over subsequent centuries a variety of historians, philosophers and diplomats have considered the ways in which states behave. That behaviour was usually linked to the success or failure of the ‘sovereign’ monarch. Published in the early sixteenth century, Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince offers an ambitious prince a roadmap to power, diplomatic success and greater sovereignty through the suggestion of methods for
the acquisition and control of territory. Machiavelli wrote in the context of foreign conquests of the weak states of the divided Italian peninsula. The transmission of sovereignty from city states and principalities to larger and larger political units – or states – culminated in Europe with the ‘Peace of Westphalia’ at the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648. This established – or at least codified – a new reality in Europe where ultimate political authority rested within territorially defined sovereign states. State sovereignty soon came to be fused with ideas of nationality and nationhood, so that by the mid-seventeenth century the ‘nation state’ became the basic building block of the global ‘international’ system.

The field of International Relations is the study of how the international political and economic system works. The challenge and the fascination of International Relations is that there is no universal agreement as what precisely is to be studied or indeed how it is to be studied. In the absence of such agreement there exists an ever changing and developing series of debates about how the global system operates, not only at state level, but also at individual and non-state levels.

Thus one of the first questions concerning the field of International Relations is: ‘What is to be studied’? As noted above, the traditional answer to that question is ‘the State’. States are still the dominant unit and force in the international political hierarchy. Indeed, the process by which states are created and collapse is a central area of study within international relations and international relations history. States ultimately determine what is allowed and what is not allowed in the international system, they act singly, through multi-state alliances, and since the early twentieth century through international organisations such as the United Nations. Significantly too, states are the only ‘legitimate’ international actors that are allowed to use force – both internally, through their domestic legal systems, and externally, through their military forces, to defend their territory and interests.

Others argue that the primary consideration in the study of international relations is not the state. They focus on the structure of the international system itself and the distribution of power therein. Such views consider the shape and interplay of larger economic, political, military and social forces to which states are subject – such as globalisation, environmental change, resource depletion or international movements such as that for civil rights.

For others, that macro-perspective is too broad, and they insist that the primary focus of study has to be on the human person, their security and their emancipation. Of course, whichever ‘level of analysis’ is chosen; the international system, the states, or the individual, all are interdependent and change as any one level impacts upon the others.

The ‘how’ of international relations is perhaps even more vigorously contested. At the most basic level, the first argument centres upon the degree to which, if at all, we can search for objective truth in international relations. For most scholars, the study of international relations is precisely that; to identify patterns of human behaviour over time, to study those patterns and then to develop theories by which we can describe, explain and even perhaps predict human behaviour at the global level. Whether that is a historian explaining the rise and fall of great empires, a
political scientist seeking to identify the causes of war or an economist discovering
the reasons behind international poverty, they are united in their search for
explanations.

For others, however, such a perspective misses the point. For them, ‘truth’ is a
malleable concept, one which is shaped by deep cultural assumptions, by the power
of well-established elites and by basic inequalities within the international system.
For these scholars, the ‘scientific method’ of objective, analytical research is itself a
myth: scientists create their own science. Instead, these scholars aim to uncover
hidden voices, to understand how key assumptions about the world are built up over
time, how these assumptions are then disseminated and challenged and how they
ultimately come to exercise such power over our understanding of the world. The
historian unearthing the hidden stories of women in war, political studies of how the
concept of security has evolved and economists’ contesting notions of prosperity and
development are all challenging the accepted norms of international relations.

Attempting to answer the question posed on the nature of ‘truth’ in international
relations opens a further vista of contrasting explanations and understandings as to
how the world works. For those that see the pursuit of truth to be a valid and
necessary exercise (in other words those adopt a ‘scientific/rationalist’ approach)
three distinctive ways of looking at the world are usually offered. These approaches
(or paradigms) argue over what the primary unit of study is, what characterises their
relationship and how they see the state. While academic debate centres on which of
these paradigms offers a more accurate explanation for international relations, it is
perhaps better for the student to see these as alternative lenses through which to
view the world. Each has its own strengths and weaknesses and each ‘sees’ different
things as being significant.

For ‘realists’ the international system is defined by states seeking power in an
essentially competitive world. While there is a range of variation on these themes
within the broader realist family, the core focus of attention is on the state as a
distinctive, unitary actor. In the absence of any higher temporal authority, the
international system is then shaped by anarchy, where self-interested states strive
caselessly to secure their own survival through the acquisition and exercise of power.
Power, within this realist paradigm, is a function of the material resources at the
state’s disposal and the skill and determination of state leaders in wielding those
resources on the world stage. For the most part, the best that can be hoped for within
the international system is therefore a ‘balance of power’ between the key state actors.
When that balance is lost, conflict, and ultimately war, is the inevitable result. It
therefore is in the best interest of states to strive for peace but plan for war.

Within ‘liberal’ international relations theory, states remain important but they
are joined by international organisations such as the United Nations and the
European Union, and by transnational movements such as human rights organ-
isations and women’s movements on the stage of international relations. The liberal
internationalist approach challenges the notion of a unitary state, insisting that what
goes on within the state politically or economically is critical to an understanding of
how the state then approaches and interacts with the rest of the world. This is the
foundation of democratic peace theory which argues that democracies never or very rarely go to war with each other. Critically, liberalism does not assume that the international system is driven by competition and conflict. Instead, it argues that most international relations are defined by efforts between states to co-operate to solve shared problems such as global warming, insecurity, poverty, underdevelopment, migration and terrorism. Within some variants of this paradigm it is further argued that the development of international law and institutions create a path toward international ‘governance’. Thus, the international system increasingly binds states into certain patterns of constructive behaviour and this ultimately has the potential to civilise the international system. Overall, within this paradigm, interdependence, rather than conflict, is the key condition of international order.

In contrast with liberal internationalism, ‘structuralist’ (or Marxist) theories of international relations argue that states are simply the vehicles of self-interested elites (or classes) to defend and extend existing privileges within the international system. Within this paradigm neither conflict nor co-operation defines the international system, it is rather the exploitation of the many by the few that best explains state behaviour at global level. This approach focuses on how resources are distributed within the international system and how colonialism, and now neo-colonialism, ensure that the less-developed world continues to supply raw materials and cheap labour to the advanced economies. A major focus of this school of analysis is globalisation. It offers a trenchant critique of how this phenomenon, at one and the same time, manages to exploit the developing world while depressing the living and working conditions of most people in the developed world through the threat of labour competition. The unregulated migration of capital and the use of corporate power are other significant centres of enquiry within this approach to international relations.

Of course, as has been noted earlier, not all scholars accept that ‘scientific’ approaches such as those outlined above will deliver an all-encompassing explanation of how the world works. For their part ‘post-positivist’ or ‘reflectivist’ approaches focus instead on interrogating certain perceived ‘truths’ of international relations. This approach examines how particular concepts have come to dominate International Relations thinking and insists that it is necessary and right to put values, beliefs and identities back into the study of how the world order works. While many of these approaches differ quite profoundly on what they see as the core issues to be addressed, they do tend to share an essentially critical perspective toward the traditional study of international relations. They also tend to argue that the ‘realities’ of international relations, concepts such as power, sovereignty, the state and security, are constructed by how they are conceived intellectually rather than as a set of given facts that simply have to be accepted.

There is, therefore, a wide range of approaches that can be accommodated in whole or in part under the headline of post-positivism. ‘Constructivism’, for example, looks at how ideas shape the range of the possible within international relations and how particular ideas can determine the ways in which the international system is understood. ‘Critical theory’ interrogates our understanding of security and insists
that human emancipation and a permanent, ongoing critique of social structures is an obligation of the study of international relations. ‘Feminist’ international relations approaches look at the myriad ways in which the experience of women has been ignored or marginalised internationally and how concepts of gender have shaped the understanding and expectation of conflict and war.

Figure 1.1 – Approaches in International Relations

THE ROAD TO FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

There are a variety of ways in which international relations can be studied, yet only some of these perspectives centre upon the actions of states. Overall, however, the larger portion of scholarship in international relations does focus on states: what they do and why they do it. Moreover, if there are questions as to how central states are to an understanding of how the world works, even the most ardent post-modernist would acknowledge that in popular ‘discourse’ (i.e. how we talk about and represent the world to ourselves) states have a powerful hold over the public understanding of international relations. Indeed, the cover illustration of this text probably represents a fair image of how people view international relations: an array of ‘national’ flags such as one might expect to see outside of any major international organisation or diplomatic conference.

Foreign Policy Analysis is a field of study which is dedicated to the study of how states pursue their relations with other states, with other international actors and how they define themselves within the international system. In broad terms, its focus is upon how state-level actors come together to create and execute a foreign policy on behalf of that state. An obvious starting point is a single case study leading, ideally,
to cross-comparative studies between states that can address questions related to the foreign policies of different categories of states such as major powers, 'small' states, EU Member States or of states in general. In a field of study where state power is a core interest it is most often analyses of powerful states that gain the greatest share of academic attention. Traditionally too there has been something of a bias within Foreign Policy Analysis toward identifying models of foreign policy action. The most famous example, which for many years served to define the very nature of Foreign Policy Analysis, was the study by Graham Allison (Allison, 1971 and Allison and Zelikow, 1999) of United States foreign policy-making during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In that study he set about testing three models to see which offered the best explanation of United States and Soviet decision-making during the crisis: the rational actor model, the organisational behavioural model and the governmental politics model.

The 'rational actor' model sees government as the key actor. Governments assess their goals and objectives and the means at their disposal. Then through a process of rational calculation and cost/benefit analysis they determine the best policies to maximise the payoff to their state's interests in any particular situation. This is graphically illustrated even in the way that we write about such crises where 'Washington decided...' or 'The Russians felt...' or the 'Irish insisted...'. The nouns may be plural but the idea is singular: the state is a unitary rational actor. The abiding strength of this model is that within it, decision-making is a process that can be clearly mapped and analysed using well-established social scientific tools.

The 'organisational behavioural model' places little faith in the rationality of 'government' pointing instead toward the logic of large organisations where well-established 'standing operating procedures' set powerfully constraining parameters around what is possible in any particular circumstance. This model underlines the self-interest of bureaucratic units and their leaderships for status, resources and proximity to power. In such contexts, leaders tend to grasp at quick-fix solutions which tick boxes of essential and short-term interest with less regard for long-term goals or more strategic calculations.

The 'governmental politics model' (or 'bureaucratic politics model') shifts the focus further toward the personalities of leaders and the advisors, formal and informal, that they gather around themselves. In this model foreign policy decision-making becomes almost a game of palace intrigue, where the psychology of individual actors, their egos and self-interest, become critical drivers of debate and decision and where the aphorism of 'where you stand depends on where you sit' applies. In such a context, the dangers of 'group-think' (Janis, 1972) become greatest in the absence of rigorous tests and individuals willing to contest an emerging or even pre-existing consensus.

Even though Allison set up his study arguably with the rational actor as a straw man, he succeeded in redefining and challenging understandings of foreign policy decision-making. The middle-range theories developed, which claimed no general applicability, have since been criticised as being derived from the single, and arguably exceptional, case of United States foreign policy-making, but remain the gold standard of scholarship in the field.
In more recent years, there has been a defined shift toward the study of identity within foreign policy. Reflecting the rise of post-positivist approaches more broadly within International Relations, a number of studies have assessed the struggle over national identity and its influence over foreign policy in cases such as the United States (Campbell, 1998), Ukraine (Prizel, 1999), Israel (Barnett, 1999) China (Ripley, 2002), Germany (Lantis, 2002) and even Ireland (Tonra, 2006). This move also reflects the post-positivist ambition to look in greater detail at the role of norms and identity in world politics. The study of identity and foreign policy has a particular resonance within a European context where the European Union appears to be transforming the state itself and creating a new polity which claims to possess a ‘common’ foreign, security and defence policy.

This focus on ideas, norms and identity is not restricted to the outer shores of post-positivist or constructivist scholarship. They now also have a sound footing in more traditional scholarship where they are treated as substantive variables in decision-making models – offering conceptual road maps to policy-makers or as hooks to their decision-making (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993).

THE DEBATES WITHIN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

The particular debates within foreign policy analysis which are most relevant for a study of Ireland will to some degree depend on the issue being analysed. However, some key debates are likely to be of wide interest. As a small country, with a relatively small population, the question of size and foreign policy is of obvious concern to Ireland. What dimensions of size matter, is it geography, population, military strength, GNP or something else and in what ways does it matter? What are the priorities and strategies of foreign policy and how are they determined? What is the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy? Is foreign policy a matter of state-craft, only of interest to elites and conducted with limited reference to citizens, or a product simply of a country’s position in the international system, or is it also an expression of domestic factors? Apart from the state institutions, which other actors have an influence? Do business and NGOs, for example, influence foreign policy-making? As a member of the European Union, there is a particular context to foreign policy co-operation (discussed in detail in Chapter 9) which draws on a wider literature about the EU and its influence on national foreign policies (Tonra, 2001; Diez et al, 2005).

THE GOALS OF FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SOURCES OF INFLUENCE

The traditional goals of foreign policy, in a discipline dominated by realist conceptions of international relations, were assumed to be power and state security. Writers in the Marxist tradition or from within development studies by way of contrast, argued that it was the pursuit of the economic interests of elites (as distinct from wider populations) that dominated international affairs. Almost all modern writers recognise that foreign policy now includes a wider range of objectives. All
states will seek to advance their economic interests in their foreign policy-making, in bilateral deals, in multilateral negotiations in institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and by linking trade to other areas of policy, such as development aid, as discussed by Connolly in Chapter 10. This leaves open the question as to which goals are prioritised and who has most influence over those decisions.

The priority goals of foreign policy might seem to be the easiest question to research. An analysis of foreign policy actions or of major speeches by government leaders should give us an insight into these questions in any particular case. However, the reality can often be more complex. In answering the question as to why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, for example, which sources do we give most credence to? United States President George Bush gave a number of reasons, ranging from the existence of weapons of mass destruction to repression by Saddam Hussein of his own people. Strong critics of President Bush accused him of acting for the interests of the oil industry in seeking to control Iraq’s vast resources. Other critics said the United States was seeking to establish a military presence in a geopolitically sensitive area. Otherwise, conservative commentators such as Henry Kissinger, said the war was a mistake as Iraq and Saddaam Hussein were contained and not a threat and any attempt to ‘bring democracy’ to Iraq by force would be a disaster and would fail. Which, if any, of these goals were the most important ones, and if we do not know, how do we analyse what the United States or other states might do in similar circumstances in the future?

The goals of foreign policy and the sources which influence them are therefore strongly contested. Language and actions are capable of different interpretations and good analysis requires an analysis of different situations, a close reading of foreign policy discourse and a comparison of discourse and actions. It also requires the authors to be very clear about what precisely they are comparing and what precisely their evidence is. While trying to clarify the objectives of policy and how those objectives were decided upon it will be essential to look at a number of possible influences. What is the place of the states involved within the international system, what power and resources do they have? What other factors influence their decision-making, in particular what is the domestic context? Finally, apart from the states we are examining what other actors need to be considered as having a direct role, such as international and regional organisations, major businesses and non-governmental organisations.

THE IMPACT OF SIZE

The importance of a country’s size is not as clear cut in foreign policy as it might seem at first. Of course, the most powerful states in the world tend to be large. It is difficult to imagine any situation in which Luxembourg would rival the United States in international politics. It is not clear, however, what aspects of size matter most. The United States, as the most powerful state in the world since the end of the Cold War, is relatively large in both geography and population, but it is ‘biggest’ when you
measure military might and economic wealth and also very strong in its cultural reach. Which of these issues is most important to United States influence in the world? The answers are not obvious. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan are large states but their size has not given them influence. Until recently India was not considered a major global power despite its very large population. Japan is a wealthy state, but with only limited international power, while highly militarised North Korea is totally isolated.

The issues of size, wealth and military power are of course related. It is difficult to acquire military power without resources, but some countries have acquired considerable influence without achieving dominant power in any of these categories. The concept of ‘middle powers’ is the one that seems most relevant to Ireland (Hynek and Bosold, 2009). It does not simply describe medium-sized states (which Ireland is not) but rather a position of influence or sought after influence in the international system, which is below that of the major powers. There are a (changing) group of states in the international system that have sought such power. They have active foreign policies, often drawing on concepts of soft power, utilising development aid, willingness to act as peace mediators, or having high profiles on individual issues such as land mines, to build and secure their position. Canada, Sweden, Norway, post-Apartheid South Africa and occasionally Indonesia have often been characterised as examples of states exhibiting such behaviour. India might have been included in the past, but today, with a fast growing economy, India has ambitions to be recognised as a major power, highlighting the fact that states’ place in the global order can change.

Scholars in the realist tradition as discussed above, tend to be dismissive of the concept, focusing on more traditional measures of power such as military strength. Some authors from the Global South accept the concept but resent it to some extent, as they see it as an institutionalisation of power by comparatively wealthy states, as against poor states representing large populations. Regardless of these debates, middle powers tend to be recognised at least informally in the international system. They tend to be asked to chair or take part in commissions, to lead new initiatives, to act as potential mediators, peacekeepers or honest brokers and all of this activity gives them opportunities to play a greater role in world politics than their size alone would justify. The actual impact of this activity, in the absence of other forms of power remains an issue of debate.

THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC FACTORS

The relationship between domestic pressures and foreign policy is an ongoing debate where most scholars can agree that interconnections exist, but it is the precise impact and the direction of causation that are disputed. James Rosenau (1969) is often seen as starting the modern debate on ‘national-international linkages’, while Keohane and Nye (1977) brought it to the centre of the study of international relations. Robert Putnam’s (1988: 427) conclusion still has resonance, when he said:
It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly ‘Both, sometimes’. The more interesting questions are ‘When?’ and ‘How?’

Two issues have dominated debates in this area. Firstly, to what extent do party competition and election campaigns influence foreign policy questions and secondly, how important are domestic non-state actors in policy-making. This literature has, to date, been dominated by political scientists in the United States. In the United States, studies from the 1950s onwards tended to suggest that the United States public had quite low levels of knowledge of foreign policy (Almond, 1950; Rosenau, 1961). While there have been countervailing arguments, both the ‘common sense’ perception and the majority of academic analyses suggest that despite the United States’s hegemonic status, the domestic public is not strongly motivated by foreign policy issues. Recently Joseph Nye argued that the United States public paid little attention to international affairs and that foreign policy played a marginal role in the 2000 United States elections. In these circumstances according to Nye the ‘battlefields of foreign policy are left to those with special interests’ (2002: 233–4). This emphasis in the literature has been challenged from within the United States by authors such as Aldrich et al (1989) who argued that political elites can mobilise voters using foreign policy agendas and by Holsti (1996) who explores the influence of public opinion on the shaping of foreign policy. In an example of direct interest to Ireland it could be argued that the Clinton campaign used the Northern Ireland issue as a successful mobilising device for Irish-American voters in the United States presidential elections in 1992 and 1996 (O’Clery, 1996). However, whatever the specifics of United States elections and foreign policy, the question needs to be raised as to whether the dominance of United States-based research has given the international debate a bias which does not necessarily reflect wider global experiences.

Evidence from Switzerland suggests that when referenda on foreign policy issues are considered a different picture is presented. Marquis and Sciarini look at four foreign policy referenda at the federal level between 1981 and 1995 – on the United Nations, the Breton Woods institutions, the European Economic Area (EEA) and the creation of a Swiss United Nations peacekeeping corps – and compare them to the domestic policy votes. They found that voters were ‘well informed about, and active in, foreign policy’ in contrast to the findings in the dominant United States literature. Likewise Devine (2008: 4), drawing on studies by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) Anderson (1998) and Sinnott (1995) argues that research in Europe suggests a ‘growing influence of public opinion on national policy-makers, EU institutions and the course of European integration’ ... In short, [she says] the public and their opinions matter. In Ireland’s case, we have seen a very high level of activity by NGOs during the various EU referenda, surpassing that by political parties on some occasions. This involvement by the public in foreign policy-making is seen to occur, not only at election time, but also in the activity of non-governmental organisations actively campaigning on issues.
**The Impact of Non-state Actors**

Steven Hook (2002: 3) has argued that non-state actors both domestic and international are ‘increasingly potent’ in foreign policy adaptation and have ‘elevated the importance of state-society relations’ in the study of foreign policy. The role of other actors, apart from states, is certainly taken seriously now by all researchers (Smith et al, 2008). The research agenda here is wide, ranging from the impact of the so-called ‘CNN effect’, to the role of national and international NGOs, to the impact of business and bodies such as the World Economic Forum. There is no doubt that there is now a vast array of civil society organisations which are active on foreign policy matters. The questions which remain to be answered are firstly the degree to which they have any influence and secondly their real independence from states.

Debates on the role of media in foreign policy decisions have used the short-hand ‘CNN effect’ to describe the assumed impact of TV coverage of human suffering in pressuring political leaders to intervene in international crises (Robinson, 2002). However, influence can also happen in the opposite direction. It can equally be argued that government influence over the agenda (if not the precise content) of news is a strong component of any relationship between media coverage and government policy. For every TV report on starving people in Somalia which led to government action, how many reports on other humanitarian crises did not? Or alternatively, how many news reports on the United States intervention in Iraq were designed to build public support for the war, not reflect it?

The same problems exist in seeking to separate the role of non-governmental organisations in influencing government policy. How can we isolate the specific role of such organisations? Such influence can occur at two levels. It may be part of the domestic sources of foreign policy discussed above or it can occur directly, through campaigning by international civil society networks, as part of a changing system of global governance (O’Brien et al, 2000). The most famous case study of this transnational civil society is that of the international ‘ban’ on landmines (Cameron and Lawson, 1998). However, despite its dominance in the academic literature as an example of an issue which was driven by NGOs, there are serious questions in regard to the weight which is placed upon this single case (O’Dwyer, 2006). Firstly, the level of real state involvement in the campaign tends to be minimised. Significant state resources, both financial and personal, were devoted to the campaign by middle powers such as Canada. Secondly, this case took place at a very particular moment in history at the end of the Cold War, and on an issue which then seemed to offer limited security threats even to powerful defence interests. The same individuals and groups, for example, made no progress in their efforts on small arms (O’Dwyer, 2006).

For all Member States of the European Union the most significant non-state actor in their foreign policy-making is, arguably, the European Union. This has generated a large volume of literature, with very different views. Realist-orientated authors have been relatively dismissive and see the EU as no more than one other place where states negotiate foreign policy and they point to the difficulties in agreeing
common EU positions on issues such as Iraq. Others have pointed to the EU’s unique status as an international institution, as the most developed regional entity by far, and they explore the EU’s role as an actor in its own right. Research on the Europeanisation of foreign policy has focused on pressures to coordinate EU activity, driven by a desire for greater influence on the world stage. Others focused on internal processes look at the challenges of policy coordination between twenty-seven states, and the Commission (on issues such as development aid) which sees Member States bargain across policy areas, trading votes and support between the agriculture and foreign policy arenas, for example, in order to get the necessary support to proceed on any issue. Finally constructivist scholars in particular have analysed the degree to which notions of European identity have created a wider public support for a distinctive and focused EU policy and have also supported the Europeanisation of national-level decisions.

When using case studies such as the land mines treaty or an individual EU policy we need to be mindful to explore the causal factors, other than those highlighted by groups seeking to claim credit and also look at whether the same factors which are claimed to be influential had a similar outcome in other similar cases, so we can see a trend, rather than a one-off event capable of multiple interpretations. Good analysis requires careful research of multiple possible explanations and it is to the primary sources which can be used for Irish foreign policy that this chapter now turns.

PRIMARY SOURCES FOR THE STUDY OF IRISH FOREIGN POLICY

There are a variety of ways of viewing the world system and models for theorising about how it works for any type of state or actor. These concepts and perspectives can be applied to Ireland as a small state or, sometimes, as a middle power. When the question of providing evidence to back up theoretical assertions occurs or the need arises to examine cold evidence to see what, if any, theories fit specific episodes in Irish foreign relations the possibilities are, as Professor Keatinge has alluded to in his Foreword to this volume, increasingly rich. Original ‘primary source’ materials on the development and execution of Ireland’s foreign relations the possibilities are, as Professor Keatinge has alluded to in his Foreword to this volume, increasingly rich. Original ‘primary source’ materials on the development and execution of Ireland’s foreign relations, once hidden secretively in state archives and in closed collections of personal papers are easily available to the researcher. Many significant collections of documents and other media are available in original form, in printed hard copy and, increasingly, online. This section will focus on materials available in Ireland, in particular in the archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and it will also draw attention to some significant sources in other Irish and non-Irish archives. Since 1991, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has been releasing papers for public consultation from its archives under the terms of the National Archives Act (1986). In 1991 the first tranche of files, dating from 1919 to 1960, was made available at the National Archives of Ireland (NAI). Since then smaller tranches, generally covering one year, have been released on a yearly basis under a thirty-year rule.
MAIN DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COLLECTIONS AT THE
NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF IRELAND

Figure 1.2 – Original Source Material from the National Archives of
Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretaries files series</th>
<th>1920s to 1970s</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A, P and S Series)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Series files</td>
<td>1919 to early 1920s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D, GR, EA, LN, P, PP</td>
<td>1920s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-100 series</td>
<td>early to mid-1930s</td>
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<td>100-series</td>
<td>mid-1930s</td>
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<tr>
<td>200-series</td>
<td>late-1930s to mid-1940s</td>
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<tr>
<td>300-series</td>
<td>mid-1940s to 1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-series</td>
<td>mid-1940s to 1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassies Series</td>
<td>1920s to 1980s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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For the Sinn Féin/Dáil Éireann period (1919–22) the DFA Early Series (ES) along with the separate Dáil Éireann (DE) collection, the administrative and policy files of the Dáil administration, at the NAI are the main collections, but collections of private papers at the National Library and at University College Dublin Archives Department should also be consulted, as in some cases, should the files of the Bureau of Military History.

From 1922 the DFA archives divides into three main areas. The files of the Secretaries Series (A, P and S series) are the top-level, top-secret files covering the most sensitive matters facing Irish diplomats. These files were only available to the most senior officials in the Department, including the Secretary General, the Assistant Secretary General, Legal Advisor and the Private Secretary to the Secretary General. They should be any researcher’s first port of call in the DFA archives.

The General Registry Series covers all other matters at Headquarters. The 1920s files are split into a small collection named by the prefixes of its sub-sections: D (Dominions), GR (General Registry), EA (External Affairs), LN (League of Nations), P (Publicity) and PP (Passports).

In the late 1920s a new numerical division of files was instituted, the ‘number series’. This system has been inherited by the National Archives, which has in some cases augmented the system with its own accession details. In the ‘number series’, files were given a numeric prefix to denote the topic covered. For example the prefix 26 was given to League of Nations matters. In this series, for example, the file 26/95 covers Ireland’s 1930 election to the League of Nations Council.
The initial series of files in the 'number series' system is the pre-100 series. They run to the mid-1930s. The system was then augmented on a regular basis with the addition of a prefix digit whereby 26 became 126 and later 226, the subsequent series being known as 100 Series (late 1930s) and 200 series (later 1930s to mid-1940s). The subsequent 300 and 400 file series were instituted immediately after the Second World War. The 300 Series (in particular the 305 series) deals with political and security matters and the 400 Series deals with economic and cultural matters, but the divide is not always so obvious. Subsequent 500 and 600 series files cover legal and European Union matters.

By the 1960s further sub-divisions were introduced and with EEC membership in 1973, and the resulting growth in the size and scope of DFA, the existing registry system came under some stress. The mid-twentieth century filing system was then sub-divided further with the opening of new divisions such as the Anglo-Irish Division in the early 1970s. The key piece of advice when working with these files is to understand what is in each thematic and numeric series or sub-series and to consult the list of file prefixes to work out in which numeric group or groups material being sought may be found.

The third area in the DFA archives is the Embassies Series, encompassing the archives of Ireland’s overseas missions. This is a somewhat patchy collection due to the weeding (Washington, Holy See), destruction (Berlin) and loss of materials over time (London, Geneva). It mirrors the Headquarters registry and while registry filing sequences may differ from embassy to embassy, it is generally possible, where files survive, for the assiduous researcher to locate Headquarters and Embassy series files on a given topic, particularly so for the post-war years. Embassy Series files are often released in batches covering roughly five years, rather than on a year-by-year basis.

Hard copy finding aids for the NAI collection are available in the reading room at the National Archives and searchable versions of these volumes are available on the National Archives website. A number of the hard copy volumes appear to have been typed from a Dictaphone or other aural source and so there are sometimes mistakes in the naming of files due to the typist or typists picking up words incorrectly. Researchers working on these collections should, of course, remember that as with all such state collections, the material sought may be filed in more than one file or series and may appear under a title that does not necessarily reflect the subject under investigation. Researchers should think laterally, try to get into the mind of a civil servant and search accordingly. On a lighter note, new users of DFA files, and most other state paper collections, should soon realise that files are not like books and that one begins at the ‘back’ of the file where the oldest papers are.

Another NAI collection of special importance to those studying Irish foreign policy is the DT S series file of the Department of the Taoiseach. This collection covers not only files relating to cabinet and government decisions, but can be taken to cover all matters of importance concerning the state since 1922. Known as the ‘S files’, they begin at S1 and continue in roughly numerical and chronological order. There is the usual online search tool available on the NAI website and a subject and file title guide
to this collection available in the NAI Reading Room. For research on twentieth-century Irish government they are a vital source and are often a first step for researchers.

Cabinet and government minutes, for the record, provide little more than a record of the decision taken on any topic and who was present at a cabinet meeting. They can, however, be useful as each minute gives the S Series file reference of the file relating to the matter under consideration.

Foreign policy was controlled and executed by the Department of External/Foreign Affairs, but foreign policy-related matters crossed over the concerns of other departments of state. The files of the Department of Finance are often, strangely, ignored by researchers who forget the advice ‘follow the money trail’. The Department of Agriculture as well as the Department of Industry and Commerce and its derivative departments are well worth a look, but remember that much material was lost as the original Department of Industry and Commerce was split up during many changes of function since the 1950s.

At Military Archives in Cathal Brugha Barracks, Rathmines, Dublin, are the files of the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces, in particular the fascinating collection of its G2 intelligence branch. Always of value to those working on a military or security related topic (particularly for the Second World War), potential readers should be sure to ring Military Archives in advance to make an appointment to visit and consult with the archivist before undertaking research.

There is no one set repository for collections of private papers relating to Irish foreign policy, but the default location for the personal papers of twentieth-century Irish political figures has become University College Dublin Archives (UCDA). Like Military Archives, it is necessary to make contact in advance and arrange an appointment. UCDA hold the private papers of the major political figures of twentieth-century Irish foreign policy, for example Eamon de Valera, Frank Aiken, Patrick McGilligan, Desmond FitzGerald, Garret FitzGerald, and John A. Costello. Diplomats are well represented through the collections of Seán Lester, Josephine McNeill and Michael MacWhite. UCDA also hold the private papers of wartime director of military intelligence Colonel Dan Bryan. Other individual sets of papers are however held in other locations. For example, Dublin City University holds the papers of Charles Haughey and Seán Lester’s personal diaries, Trinity College holds a small collection of the personal papers of Frederick H. Boland and Jack Lynch’s personal papers are held at University College, Cork. The number of available collections is continually growing, as is the range of archival repositories with material relevant to the study of Irish foreign policy. A good starting point to get an overview of availability is the most recent edition of the Directory of Irish Archives edited by Seamus Helferty and Raymond Refaussé.

The Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI) holds the papers of the government and civil service of Northern Ireland. The CAB4 cabinet minute files are the most obvious first stop to researchers interested in Irish foreign policy. More detailed than their southern counterpart, they include not only a full record of discussions undertaken, but also memoranda submitted for cabinet consideration and supporting correspondence. The Prime Minister’s office correspondence series,
Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Home Affairs are all of relevance to students of Irish foreign policy as they contain material relating to cross-border relations. PRONI’s collection of private papers should not be ignored, including the Cahir Healy papers and the Brookeborough Diaries.

British-Irish relations form a central component of twentieth-century Irish foreign policy and The National Archives (TNA) at Kew is accordingly a necessary destination for most research into the area. PREM (Prime Minister’s Office), CO (Colonies Office), DO (Dominions Office), especially DO 35 (general files from 1930s to the 1950s) and DO 131 (Dublin Embassy), and FO (Foreign Office) (in particular FO 371) are central collections for Irish material. However, the WO (War Office), DEFE (Ministry of Defence) and T (Treasury) series collections should also be assiduously consulted, as should KV series and other Security Service files.

As TNA files are selected via an online catalogue, researchers should bear in mind that files are indexed by a select number of key words and that simply entering ‘Ireland’, ‘Eire’ or ‘Republic of Ireland’ is generally not enough to locate the desired topic. As mentioned above, lateral thinking and repeated searches on differing lines toward the same end are often the best methods to locate material on a topic.

The National Archives and Records Authority in Maryland and Washington DC, as well as the many Presidential Libraries in the United States contain a wealth of Irish-related material. Collections of State Department files at National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) are accessed via a decimal number call system whereby a specific number code will retrieve files on a specific topic. Later files are catalogued by year within specific record groups. Researchers will quickly become aware of the need to look at formerly security segregated material as well as material on general release.

Online sources now form the basis of so much research, particularly by those undertaking BA or MA dissertations, that in closing, this section covers in passing some essential sources. The Royal Irish Academy’s Documents on Irish Foreign Policy series is available online at www.difp.ie. The site is free to access, as are the websites of most other foreign policy documents publishing projects (the major exception being the Documents on British Policy Overseas series). The Oireachtas website contains contemporary and historical Dáil and Seanad debates, providing a massive foreign relations-related collection. Related websites concerning the Acts of the Oireachtas and Statutory Instruments can be consulted in tandem with the Oireachtas website to get a full picture of the development of legislation.

The main Irish national newspapers are available online in their own right or through Irish Newspapers Online. Consulting the Dictionary of Irish Biography, online or in hard copy, will save much time trying to find out about a politician’s or diplomat’s life, and the Government Departments section of Thom’s Directory will, for any given year, give an overview of staff by section and name in all government departments, including DFA. Bear in mind that Thom’s for any given year may reflect the staff list of the previous year. Thom’s has since the 1960s divided its yearly directory into two separate publications: a Commercial Directory and a Dublin Street Directory. Published since 1966 the Institute of Public Administration’s Administration Yearbook.
and Diary provides a parallel source for information on many aspects of Irish public life, including a useful catalogue of social and political organisations such as NGOs and internationally-minded campaign groups.

This section has primarily been concerned with historical source materials and it goes without saying that government, media, private organisations and NGOs all produce a wide variety of hard copy and electronic publications in their own right and make them available online.

Always, where access to archives is concerned, researchers should make prior contact with any institution they desire to visit, they should check access regulations to see if prior permissions are required, and should fully brief themselves in advance of their visit on the opening hours, rules and regulations of the facility concerned. Finally, for those making digital copies of documents, be sure to make adequate backups of any images captured and store them online or in a variety of locations.

CONCLUSION

There are a range of theories and paradigms of international relations as well as ways to explain the specific conditions affecting states and their room for manoeuvre within the international order. Geography, culture, history, economy and human interaction all impact on a state’s world view and international involvement and shape and reflect a state’s international outlook. When it comes to Ireland the same theories and concepts can be applied with equal rigour to their application to larger and more powerful states. This chapter has sought to introduce the theoretical perspectives and positions as well as explain where one might find hard evidence of Irish actions and reactions to global affairs. The following chapters mould theory, practice and history to examine Ireland’s place amongst the nations and role in international affairs.

References and further reading


